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The	  unusual	  request	  to	  prorogue	  parliament,	  made	  by	  the	  prime	  minister	  of	  Canada	  Steven	  
Harper	  just	  prior	  to	  a	  scheduled	  vote	  of	  non-­‐confidence,	  provoked	  considerable	  debate	  in	  
Canada.	  This	  article	  examines	   the	  events	   leading	  up	   to	  Harper's	   request	  as	  well	  as	   the	  
constitutionality	  of	  the	  Governor	  General's	  decision	  to	  accept	  it.	  It	  argues	  that	  the	  Governor	  
General	  followed	  the	  only	  reasonable	  course	  of	  action	  available	  to	  her.	  
	  
	  
Looking	   ahead,	   it	   is	   arguable	   that	   the	   silly	   coalition,	   the	   bully	   Prime	  Minister	   and	   the	  





On	  February	  3,	  2009,	  the	  amended	  budget	  presented	  by	  Canada’s	  Conservative	  government	  passed	  easily	  with	  the	  
support	  of	  the	  Liberal	  opposition.1	  Thus	  ended	  a	  remarkable	  chapter	  in	  Canadian	  parliamentary	  history,	  which	  some	  
were	  quick	  to	  label	  a	  “constitutional	  crisis.”	  Two	  events	  made	  this	  episode	  so	  noteworthy.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  agreement	  
signed	  by	  the	  three	  parties	  in	  opposition	  –	  the	  Liberal	  party	  (Liberals),	  the	  New	  Democratic	  party	  (NDP)	  and	  the	  Bloc	  
Québécois	   (Bloc)	   –	   under	   which	   the	   Liberals	   and	   the	   NDP,	   supported	   by	   the	   Bloc,	   offered	   to	   form	   a	   coalition	  
government	  following	  a	  promised	  defeat	  of	  the	  Conservatives	  on	  a	  scheduled	  confidence	  motion.	  The	  second	  was	  the	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decision	  of	  the	  Governor	  General,	  Her	  Excellency	  Michaëlle	  Jean,	  to	  accept	  Prime	  Minister	  Stephen	  Harper’s	  request	  to	  
prorogue	  parliament,	  allowing	  the	  Conservative	  government	  to	  avoid	  that	  same	  vote.	  
	  
The	  constitutionality	  of	  both	  the	  proposed	  coalition	  and	  the	  Governor	  General’s	  decision	  to	  grant	  the	  prorogation	  
request	  was	  immediately	  challenged.	  The	  Canadian	  parliamentary	  system	  follows	  the	  Westminster	  model	  and	  practices	  
what	  is	  known	  as	  “responsible	  government.”2	  One	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  responsible	  government	  is	  that	  a	  government	  
must	  be	  supported	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  members	  of	  parliament	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons.	  However,	  under	  the	  modern	  
party	  system,	  identifying	  such	  support	  is	  rarely	  problematic,	  and	  Canadians	  are	  accustomed	  to	  thinking	  of	  general	  
elections	   as	   having	   been	  won	   or	   lost	   by	   specific	   political	   parties.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   2008	  General	   Election,	   the	  
Conservatives	  claimed	  to	  have	  “won;”	  therefore,	  any	  attempt	  to	  change	  that	  result	  without	  another	  election	  was,	  by	  
this	  argument,	  unconstitutional	  or	  at	  least	  undemocratic.	  Another	  principle	  of	  responsible	  government	  requires	  the	  
governor	  general	  to	  act	  on	  the	  advice	  of	  the	  prime	  minister	  and	  cabinet.	  This	  is	  usually	  interpreted	  to	  mean	  that	  
(normally)	   the	  governor	  general	  must	  act	  and	  can	  only	  act	  on	   such	  advice.	  However,	  under	   special	   and	  unusual	  
circumstances,	   a	   Canadian	   governor	   general	   might	   need	   to	   either	   reject	   the	   advice	   of	   a	   prime	  minister	   or	   act	  
independently.	  To	  do	  so	  would	  be	  an	  exercise	  of	  the	  office’s	  reserve	  or	  emergency	  powers.3	  Harper	  had	  requested	  a	  
prorogation	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  a	  vote	  of	  confidence	  he	  was	  certain	  to	  lose.	  The	  prorogation	  request,	  according	  to	  this	  
line	  of	  argument,	  was	  therefore	  itself	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  responsible	  government	  as	  it	  denied	  the	  House	  of	  
Commons	  its	  constitutional	  right	  to	  withdraw	  its	  confidence	  and,	  thus,	  majority	  support	  of	  the	  Government.	  Hence,	  the	  
Governor	  General	  should	  have	  exercised	  her	  reserve	  powers	  and	  rejected	  Harper’s	  request.	  
	  
This	  article	  looks	  at	  the	  proposed	  coalition	  and	  the	  Governor	  General’s	  decision	  to	  prorogue	  parliament,	  both	  of	  which	  
reveal	  much	  about	  the	  way	  parliament	  works.	  I	  argue	  that	  neither	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  request	  nor	  the	  circumstances	  
surrounding	  it	  constituted	  an	  emergency	  and	  therefore	  did	  not	  warrant	  the	  Governor	  General’s	  use	  of	  her	  reserve	  
powers.	  Furthermore,	  while	  the	  coalition	  proposal	  was	  perfectly	  acceptable	  under	  both	  democratic	  and	  constitutional	  
principles,	  its	  viability	  was	  uncertain.	  The	  viability	  of	  the	  Coalition	  would	  not	  have	  been	  a	  factor	  had,	  say,	  the	  Harper	  
government	  resigned	  and	  the	  Governor	  General	  needed	  a	  new	  government	  to	  take	  over.	  It	  would	  have	  been	  a	  factor	  if	  
the	  Governor	  General	  worried	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	  rejecting	  a	  request	  by	  her	  prime	  minister,	  because	  there	  was	  
a	  very	  real	  possibility	  that	  she	  would	  have	  then	  been	  put	  into	  the	  position	  of	  having	  to	  call	  upon	  Stéphane	  Dion	  to	  form	  
a	   government.	   At	   the	   time	   Michaëlle	   Jean	   acceded	   to	   Harper’s	   request,	   Canada’s	   Parliament	   may	   have	   been	  
acrimonious,	  but	  was	  nevertheless	  manifestly	  workable.	  Therefore,	  her	  decision	  to	  accept	  the	  prime	  minister’s	  request	  
for	  prorogation	  fulfilled	  her	  duties	  and	  responsibilities	  as	  Canada’s	  governor	  general.	  
	  
The	  Aftermath	  of	  the	  2008	  General	  Election	  
	  
Although	  the	  incumbent	  Conservative	  party	  did	  improve	  its	  standings	  from	  127	  to	  143	  seats,4	  Canada’s	  40th	  General	  
Election	  (October	  14,	  2008)	  did	  not	  provide	  any	  political	  party	  with	  a	  majority,	  and	  this	  was	  the	  third	  election	  in	  a	  row	  
to	  result	  in	  a	  hung	  parliament	  (2004,	  2006,	  and	  2008).	  Nevertheless,	  with	  just	  12	  seats	  shy	  of	  a	  majority,	  Harper’s	  claim	  
to	  remain	  prime	  minster	  was	  not	  in	  doubt.	  After	  all,	  his	  only	  potential	  rival	  was	  Liberal	  leader	  Stéphane	  Dion,	  whose	  
party	  recorded	  its	  worst	  result	  since	  1984.5	  Holding	  95	  seats6	  at	  dissolution,	  the	  Liberals	  were	  reduced	  to	  just	  77	  seats	  
in	  2008,	  26	  seats	  fewer	  than	  the	  party	  had	  won	  in	  2006.	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  such	  a	  defeat,	  Dion	  announced	  he	  would	  resign	  
as	  soon	  as	  the	  Liberals	  chose	  a	  new	  leader	  at	  their	  next	  convention,	  then	  scheduled	  for	  April	  2009.7	  
	  
The	  First	  Session	  of	  the	  40th	  Parliament	  began	  November	  18,	  2008,	  and	  the	  first	  few	  days	  proceeded	  normally	  enough.	  
After	  five	  secret	  ballots,	  the	  Commons	  successfully	  elected	  a	  speaker.	  Prime	  Minister	  Harper	  introduced	  the	  pro	  forma	  
Bill	  C-­‐1,8	  which	  provoked	  minimal	  comment,9	  and	  then	  the	  House	  was	  duly	  summoned	  to	  the	  Senate	  Chamber	  for	  the	  
Speech	  from	  the	  Throne,	  delivered	  later	  that	  day	  (November	  19,	  2008).	  The	  debate	  on	  the	  “Address	  in	  Reply”	  began	  on	  
November	  20,	  with	  the	  usual	  amendments	  and	  subamendments	  proposed	  by	  the	  opposition.	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The	  Liberals	  in	  Official	  Opposition	  made	  no	  attempt	  to	  use	  their	  amendments	  to	  bring	  down	  the	  government.	  Instead,	  
as	  Dion	  explained,	  the	  Liberals	  merely	  wanted	  to	  insert	  a	  statement	  of	  principle	  into	  the	  Address	  under	  which	  the	  
Government	  acknowledged	  that,	  without	  a	  majority,	  it	  was	  under	  some	  obligation	  to	  consult	  the	  opposition	  parties	  on	  
key	  policy	  areas.	  The	  Conservatives	  countered	  by	  warning	  the	  House	  that	  the	  Government	  expected	  all	  parties	  to	  deal	  
with	  the	  scheduled	  votes	  (on	  the	  subamendment,	  amendment,	  and	  finally	  the	  Address)	  expeditiously	  “because	  this	  will	  
be	   a	   confidence	   matter.”	   Still,	   the	   Liberal	   amendment	   received	   general	   support,	   including	   support	   from	   the	  
Government	  side,10	  and	  on	  November	  27,	  2008	  the	  Address	  as	  amended	  was	  passed	  without	  the	  need	  for	  a	  recorded	  
vote.11	  
	  
Just	  before	  the	  final	  vote	  on	  the	  Address,	  Minister	  of	  Finance	  Jim	  Flaherty	  presented	  an	  “economic	  update.”	  This	  was	  
not	  to	  be	  a	  budget,	  but	  rather	  a	  statement	  designed	  to	  calm	  the	  fears	  of	  worried	  investors	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  a	  world-­‐wide	  
economic	  crisis.	  The	  response	  to	  the	  update,	  while	  not	  surprising,	  was	  nevertheless	  far	  more	  vociferous	  than	  the	  
Government	  expected.	  One	  issue	  which	  seemed	  to	  be	  particularly	  galling	  to	  the	  opposition	  parties	  was	  the	  decision	  to	  
eliminate	  direct	  public	  financing	  of	  political	  parties.12	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  incorrect	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  was	  the	  only	  
factor	  informing	  the	  opposition	  parties’	  next	  set	  of	  moves.	  They	  consistently	  argued	  that	  their	  main	  concern	  was	  their	  
loss	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Government	  to	  manage	  the	  growing	  economic	  crisis.	  
	  
The	  Liberals	  then	  gave	  notice	  that	  they	  would	  move	  a	  vote	  of	  nonconfidence	  in	  the	  government	  on	  the	  following	  
Monday,	  December	  2,	  2008,	  its	  “opposition	  day.”	  Given	  that	  this	  vote	  would	  come	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  economic	  update,	  
the	  Liberals	  argued	  that	  the	  nonconfidence	  vote	  would	  be	  fatal	  as	  it	  would	  carry	  the	  same	  weight	  as	  a	  defeat	  of	  a	  
budget.	  The	  Government	  responded	  by	  postponing	  the	  opposition	  day	  by	  one	  week	  (to	  December	  8,	  2008),	  and	  
cancelling	  a	  ways-­‐and-­‐means	  motion	  that	  had	  also	  been	  scheduled	  for	  December	  2.13	  A	  loss	  of	  either	  vote	  would	  likely	  
have	  been	  sufficient	  to	  force	  the	  government	  to	  either	  resign	  or	  request	  a	  dissolution.14	  Therefore,	  the	  Government	  did	  
what	  it	  thought	  necessary	  to	  buy	  some	  time.	  
	  
The	  Conservatives	  must	  have	  assumed	  that	  the	  longer	  the	  opposition	  parties	  had	  to	  think	  about	  the	  prospect	  of	  forcing	  
an	  election,	  the	  better	  the	  chances	  one	  or	  more	  parties,	  specifically	  the	  Liberals,	  would	  back	  away	  from	  voting	  against	  
the	  Government.	  Furthermore,	  some	  Liberal	  MPs	  were	  now	  voicing	  their	  impatience	  with	  Dion’s	  leadership,	  calling	  on	  
him	  to	  resign	  now,	  rather	  than	  wait	  for	  the	  April	  convention	  (Taber,	  2008a).	  Led	  by	  an	  unpopular	  and	  lame-­‐duck	  leader,	  
it	  did	  indeed	  seem	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  the	  Liberals	  would	  provide	  the	  Conservatives	  with	  an	  excuse	  to	  call	  another	  
election.	  But	  the	  Conservatives	  must	  have	  been	  surprised	  by	  what	  the	  Liberals	  did	  instead.	  
	  
No	  doubt	  modelling	  their	  actions	  on	  the	  1985	  Ontario	  Liberal-­‐NDP	  Accord	  (see	  White,	  1988),	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  federal	  
Liberal,	  NDP	  and	  Bloc	  parties	  reached	  an	  agreement	  under	  which	  they	  would	  present	  to	  the	  Governor	  General	  the	  
option	  of	  calling	  on	  the	  Liberals	  and	  NDP	  to	  form	  a	  coalition	  government,	  were	  the	  Conservatives	  to	  be	  defeated	  on	  the	  
nonconfidence	  motion.	  Although	  its	  MPs	  would	  not	  be	  invited	  to	  join	  the	  coalition	  cabinet,	  the	  Bloc	  promised	  not	  to	  
vote	  against	  the	  Coalition	  on	  matters	  of	  confidence.	  The	  immediate	  effect	  was	  panic	  within	  the	  Government.	  But	  still	  
believing	  that	  time	  would	  work	  against	  the	  opposition	  alliance,	  Harper	  then	  made	  an	  unusual	  move.	  Despite	  the	  
pending	  confidence	  vote,	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  asked	  the	  Governor	  General	   to	  prorogue	  parliament.	  This	  was	  duly	  
granted	  on	  Thursday	  December	  4,	   2008,	  with	   the	   Second	  Session	  of	   the	  40th	  Parliament	   scheduled	   to	   convene	  
Monday,	  January	  26,	  2009.	  
	  
Yet	  the	  drama	  was	  not	  over	  yet.	  On	  December	  3,	  2008,	  the	  night	  before	  he	  was	  scheduled	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  Governor	  
General,	  Harper	  went	  on	  national	  television	  to	  explain	  why	  he	  was	  about	  to	  request	  a	  prorogation.	  Liberal	  leader	  Dion	  
followed	  suit	  with	  a	  televised	  address	  described	  by	  commentators	  as	  an	  amateur	  video	  better	  suited	  for	  YouTube	  
(Doyle	  2008).	  This	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  last	  straw	  for	  the	  Liberal	  caucus,	  and	  calls	  for	  Dion’s	  immediate	  resignation	  now	  
grew	  stronger	  (Whittington	  and	  Brennan	  2008;	  Clark	  and	  Chase	  2008).	  The	  pressure	  to	  leave	  proved	  too	  much,	  and	  on	  
December	  8,	  2008,	  Dion	  clarified	  what	  he	  meant	  when	  he	  promised	  to	  resign	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  next	  leader	  was	  chosen:	  he	  
would	  resign	  immediately	  if	  the	  party	  could	  find	  a	  means	  to	  choose	  his	  replacement	  immediately	  (Laghi	  and	  Clark	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2008).	  However,	  choosing	  a	  new	  leader	  immediately	  was	  not	  simple.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  problems	  presented	  by	  the	  
Liberal’s	  constitution	  regarding	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  national	  leader,	  three	  MPs	  had	  already	  declared	  their	  candidacy	  for	  the	  
position:	  Michael	   Ignatieff,	  Bob	  Rae15	  and	  Dominic	  LeBlanc	  (the	  first	  two	  having	  run	  against	  Dion	  in	  the	  previous	  
leadership	  contest).	  However,	  LeBlanc	  soon	  pulled	  out	  and	  threw	  his	  support	  behind	  Ignatieff.	  The	  next	  day	  (December	  
9,	  2008),	  Rae	  announced	  that	  he	  too	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  candidate	  for	  the	  leadership,	  nor	  would	  he	  be	  in	  April	  2009	  
(Taber,	  2008b).16	  This	  left	  the	  field	  to	  Ignatieff,	  who	  without	  further	  ado	  was	  named	  the	  Liberals’	  new	  leader.
	  
Given	  that	  one	  potential	  problem	  with	  the	  proposed	  coalition	  was	  Dion’s	  imminent	  resignation,	  the	  appointment	  of	  
Ignatieff	  as	  the	  unchallenged	  leader	  of	  the	  Liberals	  should	  have	  strengthened	  the	  Coalition’s	  argument	  that	  it	  could	  
provide	  a	  stable	  government,	  and	  hence	  be	  a	  real	  and	  viable	  option	  were	  the	  Conservatives	  defeated.	  However,	  
Ignatieff	  announced	   that	  he	  was	  open	   to	   several	  possibilities,	  only	  one	  of	  which	  was	   the	  proposed	  coalition:	   “A	  
coalition	  if	  necessary,”	  he	  stated,	  alluding	  to	  McKenzie	  King’s	  famous	  1942	  plebiscite	  slogan,	  “but	  not	  necessarily	  a	  
coalition.”	  The	  Coalition	  quickly	  began	  to	  unravel	  and	  by	  the	  beginning	  of	  January	  2009,	  few	  believed	  it	  had	  any	  future.	  
This	  was	  confirmed	  January	  28,	  2009	  when	  Ignatieff	  announced	  that	  the	  Liberals	  would	  support	  the	  Conservative	  
budget,	  providing	  the	  Conservatives	  agreed	  to	  an	  amendment	  under	  which	  the	  Government	  would	  be	  obliged	  to	  
provide	   frequent	   updates	   on	   the	   success	   of	   their	   economic	   stimulation	  measures	   (Clark	   and	   Taber	   2009).	   The	  
Conservatives	  were	  happy	  to	  comply	  and	  agreed	  to	  second	  the	  motion.	  The	  Liberal	  amendment	  was	  passed	  February	  2,	  
2009	  (Yeas	  217,	  Nays	  84;	  the	  Bloc	  and	  the	  NDP	  voting	  against).	  The	  amended	  Budget	  was	  passed	  February	  3,	  2009	  with	  
a	  vote	  of	  211	  to	  91,	  and	  the	  Liberals	  supported	  all	  of	  the	  subsequent	  ways	  and	  means	  motions.17	  The	  Conservative’s	  
tenure	  was	  extended	  and	  the	  coalition	  option	  dropped.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  of	  the	  paper,	  I	  will	  look	  at	  the	  political	  and	  
constitutional	  implications	  of,	  first,	  the	  proposed	  coalition,	  and	  second,	  the	  request	  for	  prorogation.	  
	  
A	   Government	   which	   has	   been	   granted	   a	   dissolution	   may	   not	   proceed	   to	   a	   second	  
dissolution	  until	  the	  new	  Parliament	  proves	  unworkable	  and	  no	  other	  Government	  is	  likely	  
and	  willing	  to	  carry	  on	  with	  the	  existing	  House.	  (Markesinis	  1972)18	  
	  
The	  Coalition	  
Coalitions	   are	   a	   rare	   beast	   in	   Canadian	   politics,19	   so	   it	   should	   not	   be	   surprising	   that	   the	   prospect	   of	   a	   coalition	  
government	  composed	  of	  Liberals	  and	  the	  NDP	  alarmed	  many,	  at	  least	  many	  Conservatives.	  Some	  of	  those	  who	  were	  
concerned	   about	   the	   propriety	   of	   a	   coalition	   government	   seemed	   to	   believe	   (or	   purported	   to	   believe)	   that	   the	  
Commons	  could,	  on	  its	  own	  volition,	  force	  the	  Coalition	  into	  office.	  The	  fearful	  scenario	  was	  presented	  something	  like	  
this:	  the	  opposition	  parties,	  now	  united	  in	  a	  coalition	  /	  accord,	  would	  vote	  no	  confidence	  in	  the	  government	  at	  the	  first	  
opportunity.	  The	  immediate	  consequence	  of	  that	  vote	  would	  be	  the	  replacement	  of	  the	  current	  government	  with	  one	  
led	  by	  Liberal	  leader	  Stéphane	  Dion,	  whose	  cabinet	  would	  be	  composed	  of	  members	  from	  both	  the	  Liberals	  and	  the	  
NDP.20	  The	  two	  parties	  would	  govern	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Bloc,	  to	  which	  the	  Coalition	  was	  now	  beholden.21	  
Opponents,	  including	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  argued	  that	  by	  receiving	  the	  most	  seats	  in	  2008	  the	  Conservatives	  
had	  “won”	  the	  election	  and	  therefore	  had	  the	  democratic	  right	  to	  govern,	  a	  right	  manifestly	  denied	  the	  opposition	  
parties.22	  Not	  only	  did	  each	  of	   the	  opposition	  parties	  win	   fewer	   seats	   than	   the	  Conservatives,	  but	   these	  parties	  
explicitly	  denied	  during	  the	  election	  campaign	  that	  a	  coalition	  government	  was	  an	  option	  they	  would	  entertain.23	  To	  
overturn	  an	  election	  result	  by	  forcing	  the	  legitimately	  elected	  government	  out	  of	  office	  was	  therefore	  undemocratic,	  if	  
not	  unconstitutional.	  Finally,	  the	  Bloc’s	  role	  in	  this	  accord	  meant	  that	  the	  Coalition	  would	  be	  under	  the	  sway	  of	  a	  party	  
whose	  unpatriotic	  agenda	  was	  the	  “dismemberment	  of	  Canada.”24	  
	  
The	  criticism	  that	  the	  Coalition	  had	  not	  been	  voted	  into	  office,	  and	  therefore	  had	  no	  right	  to	  govern,	  can	  be	  dismissed	  
immediately.	  It	  might	  well	  be	  easier,	  and	  even	  sociologically	  accurate,	  to	  think	  of	  elections	  as	  events	  in	  which	  voters	  
choose	  one	  party	  over	  another	  to	  be	  their	  government.25	  Indeed,	  political	  parties	  have	  long	  used	  such	  an	  argument	  to	  
Canadian	  Political	  Science	  Review	  3(3)	  September	  2009	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  Governor	  General,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  Request	  to	  Prorogue	  (40-­‐54)	   	   	  44	  
bolster	   the	   national	   standing	   of	   their	   leaders.	   However,	   this	   does	   not	   alter	   the	   fact	   that	   under	   the	   Canadian	  
parliamentary	  system	  a	  general	  election	  is	  still	  the	  election	  of	  308	  MPs	  who	  are	  constitutionally	  and	  legally	  free	  to	  align	  
themselves	   in	  any	  configuration	  they	  so	  desire.	  They	  can,	  and	  sometimes	  do,	  vote	  against	  their	  parties	  and	  they	  
sometimes	  switch	  parties	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  session,	  often	  with	  spectacular	  results.26	  The	  public	  seems	  to	  prefer	  it	  
when	  government	  MPs	  vote	  against	  the	  Government	  or	  cross	  the	  floor	  to	  sit	  with	  the	  Opposition,	  rather	  than	  the	  other	  
way	  around.	  But,	  the	  point	  is,	  alignments	  and	  realignments	  do	  happen	  and	  are	  perfectly	  legitimate	  under	  our	  current	  
system.	  Furthermore,	  all	  308	  Members	  of	  Parliament,	  including	  the	  49	  Bloc	  MPs,	  were	  legally	  elected	  and	  are	  full	  
participants	  in	  all	  parliamentary	  proceedings	  and	  affairs.	  The	  Bloc’s	  agenda,	  however	  distasteful	  some	  may	  find	  it,	  does	  
not	  diminish	  the	  status	  of	  that	  party’s	  MPs,	  and	  so	  its	  support	  cannot	  be	  used	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  taint	  or	  delegitimize	  the	  
actions	  of	  other	  parties	  or	  MPs.	  
	  
As	  far	  as	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  coalition	  proposal	  was	  democratic,	  we	  need	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  even	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  
voters	  thought	  they	  were	  choosing	  one	  party	  over	  the	  other,	  the	  2008	  election	  did	  not	  produce	  a	  majority,	  and	  so	  we	  
do	  not	  know	  which	  party	  the	  voters	  preferred.	  This	  is	  precisely	  what	  a	  hung	  parliament	  means:	  a	  parliament	  in	  which	  
no	  configuration	  of	  majority	  support	  is	  obvious	  or	  has	  been	  determined.	  Until	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  meets	  and	  
establishes	  its	  voting	  patterns,	  the	  question	  of	  who	  should	  –	  or	  can	  –	  govern	  remains	  unanswered.	  It	  is	  also	  false	  to	  
claim	  that	  coalition	  governments	  are	  foreign	  to	  parliamentary	  democracy.	  In	  fact,	  a	  coalition	  government	  can	  be	  seen	  
as	  an	  assertion	  of	  the	  fundamental	  right	  of	  the	  elected	  members	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  to	  determine	  who	  should	  
govern,	  and	  as	  such,	  can	  be	  better	  seen	  as	  a	  vindication	  of	  parliament.
	  
Finally,	  all	  of	  the	  concerns	  expressed	  here	  seem	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  Coalition	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  force	  itself	  into	  power,	  
forgetting	  that	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  prime	  minister	  is	  still	  the	  prerogative	  of	  the	  governor	  general.	  The	  opposition	  does	  not	  
have	  any	  standing	  with	  the	  Governor	  General	  when	  she	  is	  considering	  a	  dissolution	  or,	  for	  that	  matter,	  a	  proroguing	  
request;	  she	  only	  takes	  advice	  from	  her	  prime	  minister,	  and	  only	  the	  most	  extraordinary	  circumstances	  would	  convince	  
her	  not	  to	  accept	  that	  advice.27	  It	  is	  also	  pure	  fantasy	  to	  imagine	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  a	  modern	  governor	  general	  would	  
dismiss	  a	  prime	  minister	  at	  the	  request	  of	  the	  opposition	  parties,	  signed	  accord	  or	  not.	  No	  opposition	  party	  in	  the	  
Canadian	  parliament	  has	  ever	  forced	  a	  government	  to	  resign.	   It	   is	  difficult	  enough	  to	  convince	  a	  stubborn	  prime	  
minister	  to	  request	  a	  dissolution.28	  Therefore,	  unless	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  resigned	  on	  his	  own	  volition,	  there	  was	  little	  if	  
any	  chance	  the	  Coalition	  would	  have	  been	  asked	  to	  form	  a	  government.29	  Meanwhile,	  from	  a	  constitutional	  standpoint	  
anyway,	  the	  coalition	  proposal	  was	  just	  that:	  a	  proposal.	  It	  was	  legally	  binding	  on	  no	  one:	  not	  on	  the	  principals,	  not	  on	  
the	  Bloc,	  and	  certainly	  not	  on	  the	  Governor	  General.30	  
	  
Until	  the	  principals	  publish	  their	  memoirs,	  we	  will	  not	  know	  whether	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Liberal,	  NDP	  or	  Bloc	  parties	  
really	  expected	  the	  Coalition	  to	  be	  asked	  to	  form	  a	  government,	  or	  whether	  instead	  their	  coalition	  proposal	  was	  a	  
strategy	  designed	  to	  frustrate	  the	  plans	  of	  the	  Conservatives.	  My	  assumption	  is	  the	  latter:	  if	  called	  upon,	  the	  leader	  of	  
the	  Liberals	  would	   indeed	  have	  formed	  a	  government	  and	  would	  have	  duly	   included	  members	  of	  the	  NDP	   in	  his	  
cabinet.	  I	  also	  assume	  that	  the	  Bloc	  would	  have	  honoured	  its	  agreement	  not	  to	  defeat	  this	  coalition	  on	  matters	  of	  
confidence.	  But	  that	  aside,	   I	  suspect	  another	  game	  was	  afoot.	  The	  opposition	  strategy	  was	  more	   likely	  meant	  to	  
remove	  –	  or	  give	   the	   impression	   it	  was	   removed	  –	  Harper’s	  weapon:	  his	   threat	   to	  dissolve	  Parliament	  were	   the	  
opposition	  parties	  to	  vote	  against	  his	  government.	  
	  
While	  no	  party	  relished	  the	  idea	  of	  jumping	  back	  into	  a	  campaign	  so	  soon	  after	  the	  previous	  one,	  the	  Conservatives	  had	  
the	  most	  to	  gain	  from	  an	  election	  and	  the	  Liberals	  the	  most	  to	  lose.31	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  no	  doubt	  Harper	  was	  
confident	  that	  while	  the	  Liberals	  might	  bluster,	  they	  would	  not	  provide	  the	  Conservatives	  an	  excuse	  to	  call	  another	  
election.	  However,	  with	  the	  Coalition	  present	  as	  a	  viable	  alternative,	  the	  Liberals	  could	  vote	  against	  the	  Government	  
with	  some	  impunity.	  With	  such	  an	  agreement	  in	  place,	  a	  confidence	  defeat	  would	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  an	  election,	  
but	  instead	  to	  a	  coalition	  government	  led	  by	  Dion.	  The	  Conservatives	  would	  certainly	  find	  such	  a	  prospect	  unpalatable,	  
and	  so	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  find	  some	  other	  way	  of	  assuring	  the	  support	  of	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  opposition	  parties.	  
Specifically,	  this	  would	  mean	  the	  opposition	  parties’	  presence	  would	  be	  noted	  and	  their	  leadership	  consulted	  on	  key	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policy	  matters.	  Thus,	  the	  minority	  parliament	  would	  function	  the	  way	  opposition	  parties	  always	  hope	  (or	  claim	  to	  hope)	  
minority	  parliaments	  will	  function:	  as	  a	  cooperative,	  deliberative	  chamber	  in	  which	  the	  opposition	  parties	  have	  a	  real	  
and	  identifiable	  influence	  on	  government	  policy.32	  
	  
Whether	   their	   strategy	   for	   “winning	   the	   initiative”33	  was	   realistic,	   there	   is	   some	  merit	   in	   the	  opposition	  parties’	  
assumption	  that	  had	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  requested	  a	  dissolution,	  he	  might	  well	  had	  been	  turned	  down.	  Such	  a	  scenario	  
has	  been	  well	  debated	  by	  parliamentary	  scholars.	  Markesinis	  writes	  that	  “[t]he	  Crown	  may	  under	  certain	  circumstances	  
refuse	  a	  dissolution	  to	  a	  minority	  government	  (whether	  defeated	  or	  undefeated),	  provided	  an	  alternative	  government	  
is	  possible	  and	  able	  to	  carry	  on	  with	  the	  existing	  House”	  (120).	  Rodney	  Brazier	  (2008)	  speculates	  in	  his	  Constitutional	  
Practice	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  hung	  parliament,	  an	  agreement	  amongst	  opposition	  parties	  to	  form	  a	  coalition	  should	  
convince	  the	  Sovereign	  to	  reject	  a	  premature	  request	  for	  dissolution	  and	  instead	  prompt	  the	  invitation	  of	  the	  leader	  of	  
the	  proposed	  coalition	  to	  form	  a	  new	  government,	  providing	  that	  coalition	  was	  viable	  (39).34	  This	  is	  supported	  by	  
Vernon	  Bogdanor	  (1995),	  who	  states	  that	  the	  first	  circumstance	  under	  which	  the	  Sovereign	  is	  entitled	  to	  refuse	  a	  
request	  for	  dissolution	  is	  “when	  an	  alternative	  government	  is	  available”	  (81;	  see	  also	  Carter	  1956:	  274	  ff.).	  This	  is	  
particularly	  true,	  Forsey	  emphasises,	  were	  a	  government	  to	  ask	  for	  a	  dissolution	  “whilst	  a	  motion	  of	  censure	  is	  under	  
debate.”	  Under	  such	  circumstances,	  “it	  is	  clearly	  the	  Crown’s	  duty	  to	  refuse.”	  (1968:	  269	  and	  186	  ff.)	  Finally,	  Geoffrey	  
Marshall	  (1984)	  quotes	  Sir	  Alan	  Lascelle,	  who	  
	  
...	  suggested	  that	  a	  dissolution	  might	  be	  refused	  if	  (1)	  the	  existing	  Parliament	  was	  still	  vital	  and	  
capable	  of	  doing	  its	  job,	  (2)	  a	  General	  Election	  would	  be	  detrimental	  to	  the	  national	  economy,	  and	  
(3)	  the	  King	  could	  rely	  on	  finding	  another	  Prime	  Minister	  who	  could	  carry	  on	  his	  government	  for	  a	  
reasonable	  period	  with	  a	  working	  majority	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  (39).	  
	  
It	  seems	  clear,	  then,	  that	  the	  Governor	  General	  would	  have	  been	  well	  within	  her	  rights	  to	  refuse	  the	  Government	  had	  it	  
requested	  a	  dissolution.	  The	  existing	  parliament	  was	  “still	  vital”	  as	  was	  evidenced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  had	  successfully	  
elected	  a	  Speaker,	  had	  passed	  Bill	  C-­‐1	  and	  its	  “Address	  in	  Reply,”	  all	  of	  which	  required	  cooperation	  by	  members	  of	  the	  
opposition	  parties.35	  That	  a	  General	  Election	  would	  be	  detrimental	  to	  the	  national	  economy	  strikes	  me	  as	  a	  spurious	  
consideration	  and	  too	  subject	  to	  speculation.	  But	  if	  not,	  then	  certainly	  the	  difficulties	  the	  national	  and	  indeed	  world	  
economies	  were	  facing	  in	  December	  2008	  were	  of	  sufficient	  magnitude	  to	  at	  least	  warrant	  prudence.	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  was	  
readily	  apparent	  that	  the	  public	  would	  not	  have	  welcomed	  another	  election.	  As	  well,	  the	  Governor	  General	  had	  a	  viable	  
alternative,	  or	  so	  the	  parties	  claimed,	  in	  the	  Coalition.	  With	  the	  agreement	  in	  place,	  one	  could	  certainly	  argue	  that	  the	  
Coalition	  could	  be	  relied	  upon	  to	  govern	  for	  a	  “reasonable	  period”	  even	  if	  that	  was	  less	  than	  the	  promised	  two	  years.	  
Finally,	  to	  grant	  a	  dissolution	  “whilst	  a	  motion	  of	  censure	  [was]	  under	  debate”	  would	  surely	  have	  been	  inappropriate.	  
	  
These	  may	  be	  moot	  points,	  but	  they	  speak	  to	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  next	  move.	  The	  opposition	  parties	  may	  well	  have	  
succeeded	  in	  convincing	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  that	  his	  option	  of	  requesting	  a	  dissolution	  was	  now	  eliminated.	  He	  at	  least	  
knew	  there	  was	  a	  distinct	  possibility	  that	  if	  he	  made	  such	  a	  request	  that	  he	  would	  be	  refused.	  But	  I	  do	  not	  think	  the	  
opposition	   parties	   guessed	   he	   would	   try	   another	   tactic	   altogether:	   to	   ask,	   not	   for	   a	   dissolution,	   but	   instead	   a	  
prorogation.	   Either	   a	   dissolution	   or	   a	   prorogation	  would	   have	   the	   same	   effect.36	   Both	  would	   kill	   the	   scheduled	  
nonconfidence	  vote.	  Yet	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  a	  prorogation,	  while	  certainly	  serious,	  is	  not	  in	  the	  same	  magnitude	  as	  
the	   devastating	   effect	   of	   a	   dissolution.	   Therefore,	   the	   circumstances	   and	   implications	   that	   must	   be	   taken	   into	  
consideration,	  before	  such	  a	  request	  could	  or	  should	  be	  denied,	  differ	  as	  well.	  Ironically,	  the	  arguments	  that	  I	  dismissed	  
above	  as	  irrelevant	  or	  misconstrued	  when	  applied	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  coalition	  proposal	  can	  now	  be	  seen	  to	  hold	  a	  
kernel	  of	  validity	  when	  applied	  to	  the	  request	  for	  prorogation.	  
	  
Ministers	  who,	  after	  Supplies	  were	  voted	  and	  the	  Mutiny	  Act37	  passed,	  should	  prorogue	  the	  
House	  and	  keep	  office	  for	  months	  after	  the	  Government	  had	  ceased	  to	  retain	  the	  confidence	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of	  the	  Commons,	  might	  or	  might	  not	  incur	  grave	  unpopularity,	  but	  would	  not	  necessarily	  
commit	  a	  breach	  of	  law.	  (Dicey	  1902,	  nt.	  1:	  26)	  
	  
Constitutionality	  of	  Proroguing	  Parliament	  
	  
Prime	  Minister	  Harper’s	  announcement	  that	  he	  would	  ask	  the	  Governor	  General	  to	  prorogue	  parliament	  provoked	  
predictable	  outrage	  amongst	  the	  opposition	  MPs.	  But	  NDP	  MP	  Pat	  Martin	  (2008)	  (Winnipeg	  Centre)	  probably	  went	  a	  
bit	  too	  far:	  “It	  is	  worrisome,”	  he	  stated	  in	  the	  Commons,	  “if	  the	  sovereign,	  in	  fact,	  overrides	  the	  will	  of	  Parliament.	  
Kings	   have	   been	   beheaded	   for	   such	   things.”	   Martin	   was	   not,	   one	   hopes,	   making	   a	   threat.	   Still,	   and	   perhaps	  
inadvertently,	  he	  raised	  an	  important	  point.	  Had	  the	  Governor	  General	  acted	  on	  her	  own	  initiative	  and	  prorogued	  
Parliament	  prior	  to	  a	  scheduled	  vote	  of	  confidence,	  then	  she	  could	  justly	  be	  accused	  of	  undermining	  responsible	  
government.	  But	  is	  this	  still	  an	  issue	  when	  the	  Governor	  General	  is	  simply	  responding	  to	  a	  request	  made	  by	  her	  prime	  
minister?	  
	  
Like	  dissolution,	   but	   unlike	   an	   adjournment	   (which	   is	   solely	   a	   prerogative	  of	   the	  House),	   proroguing	   is	   a	   Crown	  
prerogative.38	  However,	  as	  Mallory	  (1964)	  explains,	  “under	  responsible	  government	  the	  Governor	  General	  will	  only	  
prorogue	  parliament	  on	  the	  advice	  of	  the	  prime	  minister.	  Further,	  only	  the	  prime	  minister	  has	  the	  right	  to	  make	  such	  a	  
recommendation”	  (page	  number	  –	  reference).39	  Opinion	  is	  divided	  on	  whether	  the	  prorogation	  under	  discussion	  here	  
was	  in	  fact	  constitutional.40	  Those	  who	  argue	  that	  it	  was	  not	  constitutional	  maintain	  that	  taking	  steps	  to	  avoid	  and	  
indeed	  cancel	  a	  vote,	  one	  which	  promised	  to	  go	  against	  the	  government,	  undermines	  the	  principle	  of	  responsible	  
government.	  Governments	  must	  maintain	  the	  confidence	  of	  Parliament.	  Governments	  do	  so	  by	  facing	  votes	  in	  the	  
confidence	   chamber,	   the	   House	   of	   Commons.	   The	   Government’s	   request	   to	   prorogue	   Parliament,	   while	   not	  
unprecedented,41	  was	  nevertheless	  extraordinary	  and	  amounted	  to	  a	  refusal	  by	  the	  Government	  to	  allow	  the	  House	  to	  
hold	  it	  responsible.	  The	  Governor	  General,	  then,	  should	  have	  intervened	  and	  protected	  the	  constitution,	  which	  she	  has	  
sworn	  to	  do.	  She	  should	  have	  at	  least	  refused	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  request.42	  
	  
This	  argument	  has	  merit,	  but	  it	  is	  better	  applied	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  Governor	  General	  should	  have	  refused	  a	  
request	  for	  dissolution,	  had	  one	  been	  made.	  Unlike	  dissolution,	  prorogation	  does	  not	  dissolve	  parliament	  or	  erase	  the	  
results	  of	  the	  election.	  It	  does	  not	  send	  the	  Members	  of	  Parliament	  back	  to	  their	  constituencies	  to	  run	  again.	  The	  
standings	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  remain	  the	  same	  before	  and	  after	  the	  prorogation,	  and	  so	  any	  alliances	  marshalled	  
against	  the	  Government	  are	  perfectly	  capable	  of	  remaining	  intact.	  So	  even	  if	  an	  argument	  can	  be	  made	  that	  the	  Prime	  
Minister’s	  request	  for	  prorogation	  was	  inappropriate	  (for	  example,	  Weinrib,	  2009,	  and	  Jennifer	  Smith,	  2009),	  this	  
would	  not	  be	  sufficient	  reason	  for	  the	  Governor	  General	  to	  reject	  it.	  R.	  MacGregor	  Dawson	  (1944),	  in	  reviewing	  Eugene	  
Forsey’s	  The	  Royal	  Power	  of	  Dissolution	  of	  Parliament	  in	  the	  British	  Commonwealth	  (1968),	  explained	  it	  this	  way:	  
	  
But	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  distinction	  to	  be	  drawn	  between	  a	  badly	  conceived	  or	  unfair	  action	  by	  a	  Cabinet	  
and	  an	  action	  so	  at	  variance	  with	  the	  law	  or	  spirit	  of	  the	  constitution	  that	  it	  imperils	  the	  existence	  of	  
parliamentary	  institutions;	  the	  latter	  may	  justify	  the	  Governor’s	  intervention,	  the	  former	  can	  be	  
solved	  by	  more	  usual	  and	  far	  less	  objectionable	  means.	  (91)	  
	  
What	  the	  Governor	  General	  did	  was	  give	  the	  government	  a	  chance	  to	  clarify	  what	  was	  a	  complicated	  and	  uncertain	  
matter:	  did	  the	  government	  enjoy	  the	  confidence	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons,	  or	  not?	  Such	  a	  determination	  is	  not	  
always	  simple,	  and	  a	  single	  vote	  against	  the	  government,	  even	  on	  important	  matters,	  is	  not	  always	  sufficient	  to	  make	  
that	  determination.	  In	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	  while	  it	  seemed	  clear	  that	  the	  government	  was	  about	  to	  lose	  a	  crucial	  vote,	  it	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was	  not	  clear	  that	  this	  represented	  a	  permanent	  loss	  of	  confidence.	  As	  well,	  by	  granting	  the	  prorogation,	  the	  Governor	  
General	  also	  provided	  the	  Coalition	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  prove	  its	  own	  viability.	  A	  viable	  coalition	  should	  have	  
survived	  both	  the	  wait	  and	  the	  change	  of	  leadership.43	  This	  was	  a	  test	  the	  Coalition	  failed.	  
	  
There	   are	   other	   reasons	   why	   the	   Governor	   General	   would	   have	   been	   well	   advised	   to	   accept	   the	   request	   for	  
prorogation.	  Consider	  what	  would	  have	  happened	  had	  the	  Governor	  General	  refused	  it.	  Andrew	  Heard	  (2009b:	  57)	  
writes	  that	  “in	  2008	  there	  were	  very	  clear	  indications	  that	  Stephen	  Harper	  would	  not	  have	  remained	  in	  office	  simply	  to	  
be	  defeated	  in	  the	  House.”	  44	  Ned	  Franks	  (2009:	  46),	  however,	  believes	  that	  Harper	  would	  not	  have	  resigned.	  He	  
believes	  “that	  Harper	  would	  have	  then	  continued	  his	  inflammatory	  and	  constitutionally	  incorrect	  but	  popularly	  support	  
(outside	  Quebec)	  rhetoric.”	  Both,	  I	  suggest,	  would	  agree	  that	  in	  any	  case	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that,	  having	  his	  request	  for	  
prorogation	  denied,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  would	  have	  meekly	  returned	  to	  his	  job.45	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Neither	  of	  these	  options	  presented	  by	  Heard	  and	  Franks	  would	  have	  been	  palatable	  for	  the	  Governor	  General.	  Had	  
Harper’s	  request	  for	  prorogation	  been	  denied,	  but	  he	  remained	  prime	  minister,	  he	  would	  attack	  the	  Governor	  General	  
for	  her	  decision.	  Had	  he	  resigned,	  he	  would	  do	  the	  same.	  Refusing	  Harper’s	  request	  for	  prorogation	  would	  have,	  sooner	  
or	  not	  much	  later,	  prompted	  or	  even	  forced	  an	  election.	  To	  refuse	  Harper’s	  request,	  then,	  would	  have	  invariably	  led	  to	  
charges	  of	  partisanship	  and	  interference,	  and	  set	  forth	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  over	  which	  the	  Governor	  General	  would	  
have	  had	  no	  control.	  Bogdanor	  (1995)	  makes	  the	  point:	  “The	  consequence	  of	  rejecting	  advice	  would	  normally	  be	  the	  
resignation	  of	  the	  government,	  and,	  even	  if	  the	  sovereign	  were	  able	  to	  find	  another	  government,	  that	  government	  
would	  be	  in	  the	  office	  as	  the	  personal	  choice	  of	  the	  sovereign.	  ...	  No	  constitutional	  sovereign	  can	  survive	  for	  long	  once	  
he	  or	  she	  comes	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  partisan”	  (66).	  
	  
There	  were	  other	  reasons,	  some	  more	  weighty	  than	  others	  (but	  all	  worthy	  of	  consideration),	  that	  would	  have	  informed	  
the	  Governor	  General’s	  decision	  to	  accept	  Prime	  Minister	  Harper’s	  request	  for	  prorogation.	  Dion	  had	  already	  promised	  
to	  resign,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  guarantee	  that	  a	  new	  Liberal	  leader	  would	  accept	  the	  coalition	  agreement,	  or	  would	  be	  
compatible	  with	  either	  the	  NDP	  or	  the	  Bloc.	  The	  Bloc’s	  support	  of	  such	  a	  coalition	  was	  bound	  to	  cause	  that	  party	  
problems	  among	  its	  supporters	  in	  Quebec,	  and	  would	  eventually	  have	  difficulties	  accepting	  the	  compromises	  such	  an	  
agreement	  would	  demand.	  Such	  considerations	  might	  well	  have	  tipped	  the	  balance	  and	  convinced	  the	  Governor	  
General	  that	  this	  was	  not	  the	  time	  to	  break	  a	  long-­‐standing	  convention	  that	  governors	  general	  are	  supposed	  to	  accept	  
the	  advice	  of	  their	  prime	  ministers,	  nor	  did	  the	  circumstances	  require	  such	  intervention.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
I	  am	  aware	  that	  I	  am	  assigning	  the	  governor	  general	  to	  a	  rather	  passive	  role.	  Under	  my	  analysis,	  the	  governor	  general	  is	  
to	  show	  little	  if	  no	  initiative,	  and	  do	  what	  she	  or	  he	  is	  asked,	  unless	  the	  circumstances	  are	  extraordinary,	  perhaps	  
impossibly	  so.	  Not	  all	  constitutional	  experts	  share	  this	  view.	  Some,	  most	  notably	  Eugene	  Forsey	  (1964),	  see	  arguments	  
defending	  such	  passivity	  as	  insulting:	  
We	  are	  sometimes	  told	  that	  the	  only	  safe	  rule	  is	  that	  “the	  Crown	  must	  always	  follow	  the	  advice	  of	  its	  
ministers.”	  Safe?	  Suppose	  Mr.	  Diefenbaker,	  on	  April	  9,	  had	  asked	  the	  Governor	  General	  to	  dissolve	  
the	  new	  Parliament	  forthwith.	  Will	  anyone	  in	  his	  senses	  say	  that	  the	  Governor	  would	  have	  been	  
bound	   to	  consent,	   that	  a	   fresh	  election	   in	   such	  circumstances	  would	  have	  been	  “democratic”?	  
Parliamentary	  government	  means	  more	  than	  just	  counting	  heads	  instead	  of	  breaking	  them.	  It	  also	  
means	  using	   them.	  Are	  we	  parrots	  who	  can	  do	  nothing	  but	   repeat	  a	  phrase	  which,	   in	  ordinary	  
circumstances,	   is	   a	   useful	   summary	   of	   sound	   constitutional	   doctrine,	   but	   in	   extraordinary	  
circumstances	  may	  become	  a	  grotesque	  travesty?	  Or	  are	  we	  human	  beings,	  with	  brains,	  and	  the	  
gumption	  to	  apply	  them?	  (9)	  
	  
Forsey	  wished	  his	  governors	  general	  would	  show	  more	  fortitude	  and	  take	  charge	  when	  needed.	  More	  precisely,	  he	  
wanted	  his	  fellow	  political	  scientists	  to	  support	  governors	  general	  when	  they	  did.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  lack	  of	  courage	  that	  is	  the	  
problem.	  It	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  mandate.	  Coupled	  with	  this	  is	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  if	  governors	  general	  are	  to	  become	  
activistic,	  they	  will	  face	  off	  against	  extremely	  powerful	  prime	  ministers,	  often	  the	  very	  prime	  ministers	  responsible	  for	  
their	  appointment	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  It	  should	  not	  be	  surprising	  that	  a	  prudent	  governor	  general	  would	  wish	  to	  exercise	  
caution	  before	  becoming	  more	   involved	   in	  parliamentary	  and	  constitutional	  machinations.	  The	  process	  by	  which	  
people	  become	  prime	  ministers	  ensures	  that	  most	  will	  be	  at	  least	  ambitious	  if	  not	  aggressive.	  It	  would	  be	  irresponsible	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for	  a	  governor	  general	  to	  provoke	  a	  prime	  minister	  into	  escalating	  a	  stand	  off	  into	  a	  constitutional	  crisis.	  But	  what	  
prime	  minister	  would	  shy	  away	  from	  such	  a	  confrontation,	  and	  what	  prime	  minister	  would	  not	  be	  convinced	  he	  or	  she	  
would	  win?	  Yet,	  the	  role	  I	  identify	  for	  the	  governor	  general	  is	  nonetheless	  thoughtful	  for	  all	  its	  passivity.	  There	  is	  much	  
to	   consider	  when	   contemplating	   the	   consequences	   of	   accepting	   or	   rejecting	   the	   advice	   of	   a	   prime	  minister,	   of	  
determining	  whether	  a	  viable	  alternative	  exists,	  or	  of	  calculating	  the	  likelihood	  parliament	  can	  work	  things	  out	  for	  
itself:	  in	  these	  deliberations	  the	  governor	  general	  can	  be	  neither	  a	  “simple	  head	  breaker”	  not	  a	  naïve	  “parrot”.	  
	  
Dion’s	  leadership	  was	  fragile,	  and	  his	  successor	  Ignatieff	  was	  not	  interested	  in	  the	  Coalition.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  Commons	  
was	  able	  to	  pass	  its	  budget,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  revealed	  its	  confidence,	  however	  reluctant,	  in	  the	  Harper	  government.	  
Hindsight	  is	  indeed	  twenty-­‐twenty,	  but	  events	  show	  that	  the	  Governor	  General’s	  decision	  not	  to	  intervene	  was	  the	  
right	  one.	  Furthermore,	  by	  agreeing	  to	  prorogue	  parliament	  the	  Governor	  General	  did	  manage	  to	  avoid	  becoming	  
embroiled	  in	  a	  partisan	  dispute.	  She	  did	  not	  completely	  avoid	  controversy,	  but	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  a	  scenario	  in	  
which	  she	  could	  have	  avoided	  it	  altogether.	  The	  vagaries	  of	  minority	  government	  politics	  placed	  the	  Governor	  General	  
(and	  to	  be	  fair,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  as	  well)	  into	  a	  very	  difficult	  position.	  However,	  any	  intervention	  on	  her	  part,	  such	  as	  
refusing	  the	  request	  and	  inviting	  Dion	  to	  form	  a	  government,	  would	  have	  led	  to	  even	  more	  problems.	  I	  would	  agree	  
that	  had	  Harper	  demanded	  a	  dissolution,	  the	  Governor	  General	  would	  have	  been	  within	  her	  rights	  to	  say	  no,	  and	  
should	  have.	  But	  Harper	  did	  not	  demand	  a	  dissolution.	  He	  asked	  for	  something	  quite	  a	  bit	  less	  drastic	  and	  within	  his	  
rights	  to	  so	  request.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  Governor	  General	  followed	  the	  best	  route	  available	  to	  her.	  She	  did	  what	  was	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1.	  The	  budget	  was	  tabled	  January	  27,	  2009.	  
2.	  A	  useful	  overview	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Aucoin	  et	  al.	  (2004).	  
3.	  On	  when	  these	  can	  be	  exercised,	  see,	  among	  others,	  Hogg	  (2007:	  290)	  and	  Heard	  (1991:	  26).	  
4.	  The	  Conservatives	  won	  124	  seats	  in	  2006.	  
5.	  In	  1984,	  the	  Liberals	  had	  won	  just	  40	  seats,	  or	  14	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total	  (282).	  The	  77	  seats	  won	  in	  2008	  represented	  just	  25	  percent	  
of	  the	  total	  (308).	  Note	  that	  the	  Liberals	  did	  not	  contest	  Central	  Nova,	  the	  riding	  in	  which	  Green	  party	  leader	  Elizabeth	  May	  ran	  
(unsuccessfully).	  
6.	  The	  Liberals	  won	  103	  seats	  in	  the	  2006	  general	  election;	  135	  in	  2004.	  
7.	  See	  Valpy	  (2009)	  and	  Levy	  (2009)	  for	  the	  events	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  decision,	  and	  their	  context.	  
8.	  Bill	  C-­‐1,	  the	  Oaths	  of	  Office.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  bill,	  as	  explained	  by	  Marleau	  and	  Montpetit,	  is	  “to	  assert	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  
House	  of	  Commons	  and	  its	  right	  to	  choose	  its	  own	  business	  and	  to	  deliberate	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  causes	  of	  summons	  as	  
expressed	  in	  the	  Speech	  from	  the	  Throne”	  (chap.	  8:	  315).	  The	  UK	  equivalent	  is	  the	  Outlawries	  Bill,	  “a	  Bill	  which	  no	  Member	  
presents,	  which	  has	  never	  been	  printed.”	  
9.	  Although	  there	  may	  have	  been	  an	  indication	  of	  what	  was	  to	  follow:	  Harper	  decided	  to	  table	  Bill	  C-­‐1	  as	  an	  actual	  document,	  rather	  
than	  simply	  move	  first	  reading	  orally,	  a	  curious	  and	  unprecedented	  move	  of	  doubtful	  significance.	  This	  worried	  Liberal	  House	  
Leader	  Ralph	  Goodale,	  who	  asked	  why	  the	  opposition	  parties	  were	  not	  consulted	  first.	  
10.	  The	  subamendment	  was	  moved	  by	  Bloc	  leader	  Gilles	  Duceppe,	  and	  read:	  “that	  the	  House	  recognize	  that	  the	  Speech	  from	  the	  
Throne	  is	  unanimously	  decried	  in	  Quebec	  because	  it	  reflects	  a	  Conservative	  ideology	  that	  was	  rejected	  by	  78	  percent	  of	  the	  
Quebec	  nation	  on	  October	  14	  and	  that	  as	  a	  result	  the	  House	  denounce	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  does	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  consensus	  in	  
Quebec	  respecting,	  for	  instance,	  the	  legislation	  on	  young	  offenders,	  the	  repatriation	  to	  Quebec	  of	  powers	  over	  culture	  and	  
communications,	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  federal	  spending	  power	  and	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  existing	  system	  of	  securities	  
regulation.”	  The	  subamendment	  was	  defeated	  with	  238	  voting	  against	  and	  48	  [the	  Bloc	  caucus]	  voting	  in	  favour.	  The	  Liberal	  
amendment	  passed	  November	  25,	  2008.	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11.	  As	  Stewart	  points	  out,	  however,	  even	  under	  minority	  situations	  “the	  governing	  party	  has	  always	  survived	  the	  initial	  parliamentary	  
tests	  of	  confidence”	  (455).	  
12.	  The	  financing	  of	  political	  parties	  through	  direct	  government	  grants	  has	  been	  controversial	  in	  Canada.	  See	  MacIvor	  (2005)	  and	  also	  
Payne	  (1999/2000).	  
13.	  Opposition	  days	  are	  “allotted	  days,”	  and	  according	  to	  Beauchesne’s	  Parliamentary	  Rules	  &	  Forms	  (Fraser),	  “Allotted	  days	  are	  part	  
of	  Government	  Orders	  and	  may	  be	  postponed	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  government	  regardless	  of	  whether	  a	  notice	  of	  motion	  for	  
debate	  has	  been	  filed”	  (§918).	  See	  also	  Marleau	  and	  Montpetit	  (2000,	  chap.	  18).	  
14.	  See	  Desserud	  (2006).	  On	  the	  constitutional	  problems	  with	  attempting	  to	  fix	  election	  dates	  under	  the	  Westminster	  model,	  see	  
Desserud	  (2005,	  2007).	  For	  alternative	  perspectives	  on	  both,	  see	  Heard	  (2007,	  2009a).	  
15.	  Rae,	  then	  leader	  of	  the	  NDP	  in	  Ontario,	  had	  signed	  the	  famous	  Liberal-­‐NDP	  Accord	  in	  1985.	  
16.	  Had	  he	  left	  open	  the	  option	  of	  being	  a	  candidate	  in	  April,	  the	  Liberals	  would	  have	  had	  to	  appoint	  Ignatieff	  as	  an	  interim	  or	  acting	  
leader,	  something	  it	  wanted	  to	  avoid.	  
17.	  Bill	  C-­‐10,	  “An	  Act	  to	  implement	  certain	  provisions	  of	  the	  budget	  tabled	  in	  Parliament	  on	  January	  27,	  2009	  and	  related	  fiscal	  
measures,”	  received	  royal	  assent	  March	  12,	  2009.	  
18.	  On	  this	  question,	  see	  also	  Forsey	  (1951).	  
19.	  Only	  once	  has	  Canada	  seen	  a	  coalition	  government	  at	  the	  federal	  level,	  the	  1917	  Union	  Government	  formed	  during	  the	  First	  
World	  War.	  Even	  so,	  that	  coalition	  was	  born	  not	  of	  necessity	  but	  was	  instead	  a	  statement	  of	  unity	  in	  a	  time	  of	  great	  crisis.	  Sir	  
Robert	  Borden’s	  Conservative	  party,	  which	  led	  the	  coalition,	  nevertheless	  commanded	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  seats.	  At	  the	  provincial	  
level,	  coalition	  governments	  have	  been,	  in	  Dawson’s	  words,	  “not	  uncommon”	  (nt.	  11:	  174).	  But	  even	  then,	  examples	  are	  few	  
and	  far	  between.	  Manitoba	  has	  had	  several	  in	  its	  history.	  So	  has	  British	  Columbia,	  Ontario	  and,	  most	  recently,	  Saskatchewan.	  
The	  1985	  Ontario	  Liberal-­‐NDP	  Accord	  was	  not	  a	  coalition	  government,	  as	  no	  NDP	  MPPs	  sat	  in	  Cabinet.	  On	  provincial	  coalitions,	  
see	  Donnelly	  (1957)	  and	  also	  and	  Blais	  (1973).	  For	  an	  explanation	  why	  “Canadian	  federal	  parties	  have	  not	  used	  coalition	  
governments	  to	  resolve	  minority	  stalemates,”	  see	  Stewart	  (452	  ff.).	  Peter	  Russell	  examines	  the	  politics	  of	  minority	  governments	  
in	  Russell	  (2008),	  and	  also	  in	  Russell	  (2009:	  136-­‐49).	  See	  also	  Dobell.	  On	  the	  Liberal-­‐NDP	  coalition	  proposal,	  see	  White	  (2009).	  
Finally,	  for	  a	  broader	  study	  of	  coalitions	  and	  minority	  governments,	  see	  Dodd	  (1976)	  
20.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  some	  supporters	  of	  the	  Coalition	  assumed	  this	  scenario	  would	  play	  out	  this	  way	  as	  well.	  
21.	   I	   agree	  with	   Graham	  White	  who	   laments	   the	  missed	   opportunity	   for	   the	   useful	   reform	   and	   reconsideration	   of	   Canada’s	  
parliamentary	  system	  that	  a	  coalition	  government	  would	  have	  afforded.	  See	  White	  (2009:	  150-­‐60).	  See	  also	  Leduc	  (123-­‐35).	  
22.	  For	  example,	  see	  the	  editorials	  in	  the	  Globe	  and	  Mail	  and	  the	  Ottawa	  Citizen:	  “Non-­‐binding	  accord”	  (2008)	  and	  “We	  chose	  a	  party	  
(2007).”	  
23.	  However,	  the	  NDP	  did	  indeed	  hint	  during	  the	  election	  campaign	  that	  it	  was	  open	  to	  a	  coalition	  with	  the	  Liberals.	  See	  Flanagan	  
(2008).	  
24.	  Professor	  Tom	  Flanagan	  (2009)	  wrote:	  “Together,	  the	  Liberals	  and	  the	  NDP	  won	  just	  114	  seats,	  29	  fewer	  than	  the	  Conservatives.	  
They	  can	  be	  kept	  in	  power	  only	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Bloc,	  whose	  raison	  d’être	  is	  the	  dismemberment	  of	  Canada.”	  See	  Grace	  
Skogstad’s	  (2009)	  thoughtful	  study	  of	  why	  the	  proposed	  coalition	  was	  widely	  regarded	  as	  “illegitimate”	  in	  Western	  Canada.	  
25.	  The	  debate	  whether	  a	  party	  wins	  an	  election,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  has	  the	  most	  seats	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  holds	  a	  majority,	  has	  
a	  long	  history	  in	  Canada.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Angus	  (1952),	  who	  criticizes	  the	  public’s	  reaction	  to	  a	  coalition	  government	  in	  BC:	  
“Underlying	  the	  doctrine	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  implicit	  a	  feeling,	  foreign	  to	  parliamentary	  government,	  that	  the	  people	  elect	  not	  
only	  the	  legislature	  but	  an	  administration	  as	  well”	  (521).	  Ned	  Franks	  (2009:	  39-­‐41)	  also	  discusses	  such	  arguments.	  See	  also	  
Neatby	  (1963).	  Concerning	  the	  1925	  general	  election,	  in	  which	  no	  party	  received	  a	  majority,	  Neatby	  summarizes	  what	  he	  takes	  
to	  be	  Byng’s	  reasoning	  in	  eventually	  asking	  Meighen	  to	  form	  a	  government:	  “The	  Conservatives	  had	  won	  [sic]	  and	  it	  was	  only	  
fair	  that	  Meighen	  should	  receive	  the	  victor’s	  laurels.	  It	  was	  Byng’s	  duty,	  as	  he	  conceived	  it,	  to	  award	  the	  prize”	  (83-­‐84).	  Quoted	  
in	  Stewart	  (1980,	  454).	  
26.	  Compare	  the	  outrage	  sparked	  by	  Conservative	  MP	  Belinda	  Stronach	  when	  she	  crossed	  the	  floor	  to	  accept	  a	  cabinet	  seat	  under	  
the	  Martin	  Liberal	  government	  (May	  17,	  2005)	  to	  the	  support	  for	  Conservative	  MP	  Bill	  Casey	  when	  he	  voted	  against	  the	  
Conservative	  Government.	  See	  Pammett	  (2006,	  29)	  and	  Joanna	  Smith	  (2008).	  
27.	  See	  note	  38	  below.	  On	  parliament’s	  power	  to	  advise,	  see	  Forsey	  (1963).	  
28.	  As	  we	  saw	  with	  the	  Liberal	  government	  under	  Paul	  Martin,	  who	  ignored	  a	  series	  of	  defeats	  in	  2005	  before	  he	  finally	  asked	  for	  a	  
dissolution.	  See	  Franks	  (1987:	  138	  ff.),	  Desserud	  (2006)	  and	  Heard	  (2007).	  Of	  course,	  governments	  are	  sometimes	  only	  too	  
happy	  to	  use	  a	  defeat	  in	  the	  Commons	  as	  an	  excuse	  to	  call	  an	  election	  they	  are	  confident	  they	  can	  win,	  but	  that	  is	  not	  the	  same	  
thing.	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29.	  What	  if	  the	  nonconfidence	  vote	  proceeded	  as	  planned,	  and	  Harper	  lost?	  This	  would	  have	  indeed	  been	  a	  devastating	  and	  likely	  
fatal	  blow	  to	  the	  Harper	  government.	  However,	  the	  fatal	  effects	  of	  the	  vote	  might	  not	  have	  been	  felt	  immediately.	  Nor	  would	  it	  
have	  had	  to	  be.	  In	  Desserud	  (2006)	  I	  argue	  that	  confidence	  votes	  are	  not	  the	  same	  as,	  for	  example,	  decisions	  made	  by	  a	  
Supreme	  Court,	  in	  which	  the	  vote	  is	  final	  and	  the	  effects	  immediate.	  Instead,	  nonconfidence	  votes	  are	  indications,	  some	  clearer	  
than	  others,	  of	  a	  serious	  problem	  with	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  government	  to	  command	  the	  support	  of	  the	  House.	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  
penultimate	  decision	  concerning	  whether	  the	  result	  of	  a	  nonconfidence	  vote	  is	  fatal	  to	  the	  government	  lies	  with	  the	  prime	  
minister.	  Had	  Harper	  lost	  such	  a	  vote	  but	  refused	  to	  either	  resign	  or	  request	  a	  resolution,	  he	  would	  have	  nevertheless	  remained	  
the	  prime	  minister,	  at	  least	  for	  a	  while.	  The	  ultimate	  decision,	  of	  course,	  lies	  with	  the	  governor	  general,	  but	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  say	  
how	  long	  a	  governor	  general	  would	  tolerate	  such	  behaviour.	  Longer	  than	  a	  day,	  but	  probably	  not	  as	  long	  as	  a	  year.	  However,	  
we	  have	  no	  precedence	  to	  guide	  us	  on	  this	  matter.	  
30.	   The	   1985	  Ontario	   Liberal-­‐NDP	   accord	  was	   not	   legally	   binding.	   See	  White	   (1988:	   272):	   “It	  was	   evident,	   however,	   that	   the	  
agreement	  enjoyed	  no	  force	  in	  law	  and	  that	  the	  rules	  and	  conventions	  of	  British	  parliamentary	  practice	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
crucial	  issue	  of	  confidence	  stood	  unaltered.”	  
31.	  Public	  opinion	  polls	  showed	  the	  Conservatives	  with	  a	  substantial	  lead	  over	  the	  Liberals.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Strategic	  Counsel	  poll	  
(2008).	  
32.	  Or	  perhaps	  opposition	  parties	  simply	  want	  to	  insert	  their	  policies	  into	  the	  Government’s	  legislative	  agenda.	  But	  the	  strategy	  
remains	  the	  same.	  
33.	  With	  deference	  to	  Notestein	  (1924).	  
34.	  The	  proviso	  is	  important.	  
35.	  See	  Forsey	  (1953:	  228)	  :	  “A	  legislature	  is	  elected	  to	  transact	  public	  business.	  It	  ought	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  do	  so,	  if	  it	  can	  (i.e.,	  if	  it	  can	  
elect	  a	  speaker),	  unless	  there	  are	  strong	  reasons	  of	  public	  policy	  for	  dissolving	  it.”	  See	  also	  Forsey	  (1968:	  63	  ff.).	  One	  indication	  
that	  the	  House	  can	  do	  its	  job	  is	  when	  it	  has	  done	  its	  job,	  such	  as	  pass	  its	  supply	  bills	  (see	  Dicey	  quotation	  below).	  It	  would	  be	  
irresponsible	  for	  the	  Crown	  to	  allow	  a	  dissolution,	  or	  for	  that	  matter	  a	  prorogation,	  before	  Supply	  had	  been	  passed,	  because	  
this	  would	  mean	  the	  Government	  would	  not	  have	  access	  to	  the	  funds	  it	  needs	  to	  govern.	  This	  is	  what	  took	  place	  in	  Manitoba	  in	  
1922	  when	  Lieutenant-­‐Governor	  Sir	  James	  Aikins	  refused	  Premier	  T.C.	  Norris’s	  request	  for	  dissolution	  after	  he	  was	  “defeated	  
on	  a	  motion	  of	  non-­‐confidence	  respecting	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission.”	  Aikins	  reportedly	  told	  Norris	  that	  
“the	  Legislature	  had	  been	  summoned	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  business	  of	  the	  province	  and	  when	  it	  had	  done	  so	  (which	  took	  about	  two	  
weeks)	  he	  would	  dissolve	  it”	  (Bosiak	  1989,	  1st	  para).	  The	  situation	  is,	  however,	  a	  little	  more	  complicated	  now	  at	  the	  federal	  
level	  in	  Canada.	  Under	  Canada’s	  Financial	  Administration	  Act,	  the	  governor	  general,	  on	  the	  advice	  of	  the	  government,	  can	  
“issue	  special	  warrants	  authorising	  expenditure	  not	  approved	  by	  Parliament”	  even	  if	  Parliament	  was	  prorogued	  or	  dissolved.	  
David	  Hamer	  (2004)	  maintains	  that	  Canada	  “destroyed	  a	  vital	  part	  of	  responsible	  government”	  with	  this	  bill	  (107).	  
36.	  An	  adjournment	  was	  not	  an	  option,	  if	  only	  because	  this	  require	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  House	  Leaders.	  In	  general,	  see	  Thomas	  (1982).	  
37.	   According	   to	   Dicey	   (1902),	   the	   practice	   of	   passing	   the	  Mutiny	   Act	   yearly	  was	   designed	   to	   enforce	   certain	   parliamentary	  
conventions.	  The	  act	  itself	  asserted	  parliament’s	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  military	  (specifically,	  that	  a	  standing	  army	  can	  exist	  only	  
with	  Parliament’s	  approval).	  To	  fail	  to	  pass	  such	  a	  bill	  would,	  theoretically,	  have	  led	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  this	  power	  and	  perhaps	  a	  
standing	  army	  beyond	  parliament’s	  control.	  Hence	  parliament	  had	  to	  pass	  it	  every	  year	  (and	  did	  so	  until	  1879),	  which	  meant	  
that	  the	  convention	  that	  parliament	  must	  meet	  at	  least	  once	  a	  year	  was	  upheld	  (75).	  The	  bill	  was	  not,	  then	  pro	  forma,	  like	  the	  
Outlawries	  Act	  or	  Canada’s	  Oaths	  of	  Office,	  but	  was	  nevertheless	  a	  part	  of	  the	  conventions	  of	  parliament,	  and	  its	  passage	  an	  
indication	  that	  a	  new	  parliament	  had	  settled	  in	  to	  do	  its	  work.	  On	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Mutiny	  Act,	  see	  Glazier	  (2005),	  and	  also	  
Duke	  and	  Vogel	  (1960).	  
38.	  Letters	  Patent	  Constituting	  the	  Office	  of	  Governor	  General	  of	  Canada	  (October	  1,	  1947):	  Summoning,	  proroguing,	  VI.	  “And	  We	  do	  
further	  authorize	  and	  empower	  Our	  Governor	  General	   to	   the	  exercise	  all	  powers	   lawfully	  belonging	   to	  Us	   in	   respect	  of	  
summoning,	  proroguing	  Parliament	  or	  dissolving	  the	  Parliament	  of	  Canada”	  (Funston	  1994,	  342).	  See	  also	  Mundell	  (1960-­‐63)	  
and	  David	  Smith	  (2007,	  128ff.).	  
39.	  Marleau	  and	  Montpetit	  (2000)	  write:	  “See	  Privy	  Council	  minute,	  P.	  C.	  3374,	  dated	  October	  25,	  1935,	  a	  ‘Memorandum	  regarding	  
certain	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister’,	  which	  stated	  that	  recommendations	  (to	  the	  Crown)	  concerning	  the	  convocation	  
and	  dissolution	  of	  Parliament	  are	  the	  ‘special	  prerogatives’	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister”	  (nt.	  12:	  310).	  See	  also	  Marshall	  (1984)	  who	  
quotes	  Prime	  Minister	  Pearson’s	  response	  to	  a	  question	  concerning	  the	  use	  of	  an	  “instrument	  of	  advice”	  rather	  than	  a	  formal	  
“minute	  of	  Council”	  when	  advising	  the	  governor	  general	  on	  matters	  such	  as	  dissolution.	  Pearson	  replied	  that	  “the	  minute	  of	  
Council	  was	  considered	  inappropriate	  as	  a	  means	  of	  addressing	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  on	  those	  matters	  on	  which	  tendering	  of	  
advice	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  alone	  and	  not	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council	  (H	  of	  C	  Debates,	  April	  4,	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1966)”	  (48).	  Finally,	  see	  Bogdanor	  (1995)	  who	  writes,	  “In	  Britain,	  since	  1918,	  the	  convention	  has	  been	  that	  it	  is	  the	  prime	  
minister,	  and	  not	  the	  cabinet,	  who	  decides	  to	  seek	  a	  dissolution”	  (81).	  
40.	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  variety	  of	  responses	  compiled	  in	  “Forum”	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Russell	  and	  Sossin	  (2009),	  in	  particular	  the	  engaging	  
and	  contrasting	  arguments	  provided	  by	  Franks	  (2009:	  33-­‐46)	  and	  Heard	  (2009b:	  47-­‐62).	  
41.	  Heard	  (2007)	  refers	  his	  readers	  to	  “a	  key	  motion	  proposed	  in	  1873,	  dealing	  with	  the	  Pacific	  scandal;	  the	  1873	  motion	  died	  on	  the	  
order	  paper,	  with	  the	  House	  prorogued	  before	  a	  vote	  was	  taken”	  (nt.	  13:	  414).	  
42.	  To	  which	  Heard	  (2009b)	  would	  add	  that	   in	  granting	  the	  request,	   the	  Governor	  General	  set	  an	  unfortunate	  and	  dangerous	  
precedent:	  “Now	  a	  prime	  minister	  can	  demand	  that	  Parliament	  be	  suspended	  whenever	  he	  or	  she	  believes	  that	  such	  a	  course	  
might	  break	  the	  resolve	  of	  the	  opposition;	  the	  length	  of	  that	  suspension	  is	  also	  indeterminate”	  (60).	  The	  question	  is,	  then,	  
which	  precedent	  was	  worse	  to	  set:	  the	  one	  Heard	  describes,	  or	  the	  precedent	  of	  a	  governor	  general	  refusing	  a	  constitutionally	  
legal	  request	  from	  her	  prime	  minister.	  	  
43.	  An	  anonymous	  reviewer	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  Governor	  General’s	  decision	  changed	  the	  political	  landscape;	  had	  the	  Governor	  
General	  refused	  the	  request	  and	  appointed	  Dion	  prime	  minister,	  the	  Coalition	  would	  have	  fared	  better.	  Possibly.	  I	  would	  argue,	  
however,	  that	  while	  the	  pressures	  within	  and	  among	  the	  three	  parties	  to	  maintain	  their	  agreement	  would	  be	  different	  had	  the	  
coalition	  formed	  a	  government,	  they	  would	  be	  no	  weaker,	  and	  likely	  much	  stronger,	  than	  those	  that	  caused	  the	  coalition	  to	  fall	  
apart	  after	  the	  decision	  to	  prorogue	  was	  made.	  On	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  proposed	  coalition,	  see	  Franks	  (2009:	  37:41).	  
44.	  See	  also	  Heard	  (1991):	  “It	  is	  often	  suggested	  that	  the	  proper	  course	  for	  prime	  ministers	  who	  find	  their	  advice	  refused	  by	  the	  
governor	  is	  to	  offer	  their	  resignation”	  (29-­‐30).	  Bogdanor	  (1995,	  66)	  and	  Marshall	  (1984,	  35-­‐44)	  concur.	  
45.	  My	  own	  belief	  is	  that,	  had	  Harper’s	  request	  for	  prorogation	  been	  turned	  down,	  he	  would	  have	  either	  resigned	  immediately	  or	  
demanded	  a	  dissolution.	  The	  second	  option	  would	  have	  been	  a	  means	  of	  upping	  the	  ante	  and	  provoking	  a	  constitutional	  crisis.	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